Introduction
The central topic of this paper concerns the possible eÚ ect that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have on the technological performance of companies. This subject is clearly related, but not identical, to the more general question regarding the economic bene ts (pro tability) of M&As. A number of in uential industrial organization studies suggest that companies realize diminishing pro tability for an extended period of time after an M&A because of the cost of integration and poor performance of acquired units. 1 However, other contributions 2 suggest that long-term positive results for M&As are found for diversi cation through M&As across related product lines.
Largely inspired by Rumelt, 3 the management literature has also moved away from a general evaluation of the economic performance of M&As to an evaluation of diÚ erent forms of M&As, such as horizontal, vertical and unrelated M&As. 4 Although there is still considerable disagreement within the literature, a substantial part of it expects, primarily on theoretical grounds, that related M&As show superior performance because of synergetic eÚ ects through economies of scale and scope.
In this contribution we will attempt to take the debate on M&As somewhat further by studying their eÚ ect on the technological performance of companies in an international context. As indicated by Link, 5 little research was done on this particular subject before the late-1980s. In recent years a small number of contributions to the management literature 6 have put this topic on the research agenda, although the international context has remained limited.
It is important to note that the technological performance of M&As re ects the longterm eÚ ects of M&As. Technology related incentives for M&As aÚ ect long-term strategic variables which tend to be underestimated in much of the current empirical research, that usually focuses on the short-term, economic eÚ ects of M&As. 7 In these long-term eÚ ects the expected synergetic characteristics of M&As can contribute to technological performance through the invention of new process-related technologies and new product-related technologies by the combined companies. These new technologies (inventions) can eventually lead to improved pro tability of companies if they are transformed into actual innovations, i.e. new products and processes that are successfully introduced to the market. There can also be short-term eÚ ects of M&As when the acquiring company intends to only obtain access to R&D and technological capabilities to simply produce an already existing, combined technological output. However, when these existing capabilities are used in the further development of new technological output, these short-term eÚ ects are expected to be limited in comparison to the long-term, synergetic technological eÚ ects of M&As. This eÚ ect of merging companies is a well-known classic issue in the innovation literature 8 where increased size of companies and synergies, through internal growth or by means of M&As, are positively related to long-term technological performance.
The technological eÚ ect of M&As is also discussed in some previous research on a related issue, i.e. the motivation for M&As. Frequently mentioned motives for M&As are: increased market share, improved eÝ ciency, expanded R&D eÚ orts, investment adjustment, rm growth, risk reduction, speedy market entry. 9 In older work on M&As from the 1970s, increasing R&D activities and improving technological performance seem hardly relevant as motives for M&As. 10 Technological motives for M&As appear to be only moderately important across industries. 11 However, other studies 12 do suggest that M&As are an important element in the technology acquisition strategy of companies, in particular in R&D intensive (high-tech) industries. We will continue along this line and study the eÚ ect of M&As on technological performance in a high-tech sector, the computer industry. Obviously, M&As are also important in other sectors but, as mentioned above, the relation between M&As and technological performance is probably most evident in high-tech sectors.
In the following we will rst outline a general perspective on the eÚ ect of M&As on the technological performance of companies. This general perspective on M&As and the related set of hypotheses stress the importance of understanding the conditions under which M&As might have a positive eÚ ect on the technological performance of companies. In that context we will emphasize the role of strategic and organizational t in explaining technological performance diÚ erentials. Although both play a substantial role in many analyses of M&As and economic performance, strategic and organizational t have received far less attention in much of the current work on M&As, technological performance and related issues. Apart from this speci c attention paid to the role of strategic and organizational t in the technological performance of M&As, a new element in our current contribution is the international setting of companies and their M&As that goes beyond the boundaries of domestic markets. After the theoretical background and hypotheses have been explained, our paper continues with a discussion of our data, the variables and the measures used in this study. This is followed by sections in which the actual analysis, the discussion of the results and the conclusions from this paper are presented.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
In a number of seminal contributions to the literature, M&As are seen as an important element in the overall strategy of companies to respond to uncertainty within the economy at large, uncertainty within particular industries, or uncertainty in the context of repeated transactions with other companies. 13 The absorption of at least parts of their environment (i.e. other companies) by means of M&As is one of the alternatives that companies have if they attempt to reduce uncertainty, increase their control over their environment or reduce their dependency on this environment. (Other mechanisms that are relevant but which are not discussed or analyzed in the context of our current research are strategic alliances that take the form of a variety of legal and organizational modes.) This absorption of other companies by means of M&As in order to respond to uncertainty can take place through either the integration of other companies in sector(s) in which a company is already operating, or a diversi cation into another sector because the company has become too dependent on its existing environment.
14 Studying M&As from a more sector-speci c perspective, some authors 15 arrive at somewhat similar conclusions as M&As are seen as a mechanism to increase control over the environment of companies in quickly changing, R&D intensive, industries.
However, increasing control over the current or the new environment of companies cannot be taken as a goal in itself. The search for new, rewarding opportunities has to be part of this process of absorption of a company's environment. As a consequence, in order for a company to be successful, the objective of increasing control and integration by means of M&As ultimately has to lead to improved performance. In the context of companies operating in a high-tech, R&D intensive environment, improved performance implies that integration by means of M&As has to support the continuous search for new technological capabilities. We expect that if M&As are successful, they enable companies to further develop new skills and improve their exploratory learning so as to increase the technological performance of companies. 16 Following some suggestions in the literature 17 we propose that in order to be successful not only in establishing M&As, either in the current environment or in a new environment, but also to generate the expected results, M&As are contingent upon both a 'strategic t' and an 'organizational t' that enable M&A partners to collaborate in future activities. This implies that in order to achieve synergetic eÚ ects through M&As, the strategic t through market, product and technological complementarities or relatedness of companies has to be supplemented by an organizational t in which the organizational structure of the merging companies appears to match. EÚ ective control over parts of the environment by means of M&As which also leads to improved performance is expected to be dependent on this strategic and organizational t of the companies involved.
In the following we will discuss crucial elements of the strategic and organizational t necessary to improve the technological performance of companies in a high-tech environment, separately. We reconstructed these elements of the strategic and organizational t from the literature where these issues are analyzed in the broader context of the general performance of M&As. 18 These conditions for the success of synergetic M&As are analyzed in terms of strategic t related to the degree of the existing product-market relatedness of M&As, the technological relatedness of M&As and their organizational t. These diÚ erent elements of the t between companies cover the current markets of companies, their present and future-oriented technological activities and the similarity in their organizational structure.
Strategic Fit: Related and Unrelated M&As
In the literature one nds several categorizations of M&As in terms of their 'relatedness' which usually can be traced back to the original classi cation scheme of the US Federal Trade Commission. 19 Horizontal M&As involve companies that are closely related as to the products or services they produce, i.e. both companies operate in the same productmarket. Vertical M&As involve companies that had a potential or existing buyer-seller relationship prior to the M&A. Conglomerate or unrelated M&As involve essentially companies that are unrelated in terms of the product-markets in which they are operating and of which the M&As are part of a widely diversifying strategy. A substantial part of the literature seems to suggest that in general conglomerate M&As are less successful than horizontally and vertically-related M&As. 20 As shown by Datta 21 there are also studies that nd little or no evidence of such a relationship. On theoretical grounds, however, the idea that a strategic t of companies, in terms of a relatedness of the product-markets in which companies are operating, remains appealing. Obviously, related M&As are expected to pro t from economies of scale and scope that should generate more synergetic bene ts than in the case of unrelated M&As that have no relationship other than becoming part of one overarching system of corporate control.
As our study focuses not on the economic performance of M&As in general but on the speci c issue of technological performance, the relationship between the degree of relatedness of M&As and performance might be of a slightly diÚ erent nature. With horizontal M&As, we can expect that joint or complementary R&D programs of the combined companies will generate new technologies in which both scale and scope eÚ ects seem to be bene cial to the technological performance of the merged companies. For vertical M&As the expected eÚ ect on technological performance is probably somewhat less obvious and somewhat more speculative. Cost reduction by means of integrating upstream or downstream 'partners' could generate economic returns that can be partly reinvested in new technology programs. The integration of downstream user-rms can also help to identify market needs for new technologies, whereas the integration of upstream suppliers can bene t the introduction of new process and production technologies. 22 Therefore, the vertical integration of users and suppliers can have a positive impact on the technological performance of companies. For unrelated M&As, these eÚ ects of scope and scale economies are in general more diÝ cult to materialize and the literature suggests that these M&As are mainly intended to achieve nancial synergies. This leads us to expect that the degree of relatedness of M&As of both a horizontal or a vertical nature aÚ ects the technological performance of companies. (However, it has to be stressed that synergistic results of M&As on which we focus in this paper are still dependent on positive nancial economies in order to achieve the necessary interrelationships. In other words, without short-term economic results for M&As, longterm results in technological performance may never materialize.)
Under these conditions, the above suggests the following hypothesis:
There is a positive relationship between the relatedness of M&As of companies and the technological performance of the combined companies.
Strategic Fit: Technological Relatedness of Companies Involved in M&As
So far, most of the debate on the strategic t of companies involved in M&As seems to focus on the industry-aspect of the relatedness of companies in terms of their productmarkets. As our research deals with the technological performance of M&As, it seems appropriate to also consider the issue of technological relatedness of companies that enter into M&As. Technological relatedness of companies, then, refers to the degree to which companies are active in particular elds of technology that they share with (potential) partners in M&As. These elds of technology have to be understood in terms of the activities of companies related to relatively broad categories of technological disciplines and engineering capabilities, such as electronics, electrical engineering, chemistry, bioengineering and their sub-categories, that coincide with elds of technology as for instance identi ed by patent-classes. As with the line of reasoning for product-markets, we can expect that the more M&As are established with companies from similar, horizontally related, elds of technology and also with technologically, vertically related companies, the higher the technological performance of the combined companies. Also here, synergies in scale and scope are the main reasons for expecting these diÚ erent outcomes. Compared to technologically unrelated M&As, the synergies and combined technological activities of related M&As are expected to enable companies to shorten the innovation lead-time, share technological expertise and to engage in larger, combined projects than would be possible within the once separated companies. Somewhat surprisingly, the literature on the strategic t of companies involved in M&As seems relatively silent on this particular topic. Jemison and Sitkin 23 appear to only hint at the relevance of this aspect of strategic t. Gerpott 24 discusses technological t in the context of the successful integration of diÚ erent R&D activities after an acquisition has taken place. Assuming that the successful integration of diÚ erent R&D activities leads to improved technological performance, his empirical ndings suggest that the higher the degree of technology relatedness of companies involved in an M&A, the more successful the M&A will be. 25 According to this line of thought for understanding the importance of technological relatedness of M&As, following a similar logic as with product-market relatedness, we suggest that:
H.2 There is a positive relationship between the technological relatedness of M&As of companies and the technological performance of the combined companies. Strategic Fit: Research Intensity of Companies Involved in M&As
The technological aspect of the strategic t of M&As, discussed in the previous section, covers the 'breadth' of the potential sharing of technological capabilities of companies across elds of technology. As far as the 'depth' of technological relatedness is concerned, i.e. the complementarity of their actual research eÚ ort, the question remains whether companies look for M&A partners that have a similar or preferably a higher level of research activity. This strategic t or depth of the technological relatedness expresses the attempt of M&A-active companies to nd technologically more advanced partners instead of technologically less advanced companies. Early research suggests that companies in mature industries with low R&D intensity appear to form M&As with companies in R&D-intensive industries in order to diversify into high-tech areas. 26 However, MacDonald 27 found no evidence of such dissimilarity. His research mainly indicates that R&D intensive rms aim at M&As with companies from other R&D intensive sectors, that are similar in their R&D orientation in order to reach synergies in future R&D. Hall 28 also mentions the importance of synergistic motives for explaining M&As in R&D intensive industries. She suggests that R&D intensive companies form M&As with other R&D intensive rms whether they are from similar or from diÚ erent industries.
The above suggests that it is important to consider the eÚ ect of the R&D intensity of M&A partners on their combined technological output. Then, if one controls for the research intensity of the sectors in which M&As take place, we can expect that M&As with companies that have a higher R&D intensity than their sector average tend to lead to higher technological output. A major motive for M&As with companies of higher R&D intensity is that these companies can be expected to have certain research capabilities and relevant skills that are future-oriented. This is probably important in a variety of industries but in particular in a high-tech environment where R&D capabilities are crucial for the further growth and development of companies. 29 In other words, the 'depth' of this technological relatedness is found in the complementarity of more R&D intensive M&A partners that are instrumental in creating new knowledge through R&D that is expected to gradually improve technological performance. Contrary to this, M&As with companies of lower R&D intensity than their sector average will lead to lower technological performance of the combined companies. As the combined R&D activity of these merged companies decreases, we can expect that a gradual erosion of the technological capabilities of these companies which will be translated into a decreasing technological performance. Hence:
H.3 There is a positive relationship between the level of R&D intensity of partner-companies in
M&As and the technological performance of the combined companies.
Organizational Fit: Company Size and M&As
Although the concept of organizational t between companies involved in M&As covers a large number of aspects related to administrative routines and company-speci c characteristics, 30 in our opinion similarities or diÚ erences in size of companies do, to a large extent, catch many aspects of organizational t. Size of companies also relates to diÚ erences in organizational forms such as multi-divisional company structures and singledivisional companies that characterize diÚ erences between small and large companies. 31 As a 'proxy' for organizational t we can understand size of companies to express 'certain ways of doing business'. In other words, large companies have generally developed a completely diÚ erent way of organizing themselves, for instance along divisional structures and other formal organizational routines, that is quite diÚ erent from small and medium sized companies where informal structures are still most common. This not only applies to diÚ erences in general, but in particular to the diÚ erent roles that large and small companies play with regard to technological development. 32 This implies that M&As between companies of diÚ erent sizes have organizational consequences, in terms of the actual organizational t of companies, that can aÚ ect the technological output after the M&A has taken place. There is some evidence that the organizational diÚ erences between large and some small companies in the actual management of the innovation process are diminishing, 33 but we expect that by and large these diÚ erences still exist. In particular, we can expect diÚ erent procedures for R&D allocation and diÚ erences in strategic technology decision-making.
The empirical research seems to support this understanding of the diÚ erences in organizational t between large and small rms. Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Sueverkruep 34 found that combinations of large and small companies are confronted with organizational problems aÚ ecting technical success after the M&A took place. Similarly, Gerpott 35 established that the size ratio of acquiring and acquired company aÚ ects the degree to which R&D functions are successfully integrated after an M&A. Smaller ratios (indicating a merger of companies that are close to being equal in size) are found to be related to more successful integration, whereas large size diÚ erentials within the M&A generate major diÝ culties with integrating the R&D activities of M&A partners.
What this part of the empirical literature suggests is that the lack of organizational t between companies of diÚ erent size classes has some serious consequences for the integration of the innovative activities of diÚ erent M&A partners. This seems to contradict a large part of the literature 36 that suggests that the disparity between sizes of merging companies might be relatively easy to deal with in case of the integration of manufacturing, marketing and sales. However, in the complex world of non-routinized and specialized R&D associated with speci c technological capabilities, organizational integration aimed at technological performance might be more complex and more diÝ cult to achieve than improved performance related to largely standard activities such as manufacturing and sales. 37 This implies that, if companies are too far apart in terms of their size and related aspects of their organizational structure, the realization of improved technological performance after the M&A might not be as simple as assumed on the basis of simple arithmetic. In other words, adding up the research and other technological activities of smaller partners to those of a large company, assuming that the integration process will take place rather smoothly, underestimates the organizational intricacies of such an M&A between unequal partners. Hence: 
Methods

Sample
The level of analysis in this study refers to the companies that are engaged in M&As and not to individual M&As. The main reason for this approach is that technological performance is generally measured at the level of the company and not at the level of an individual M&A. In particular for a small acquisition the eÚ ect on the technological performance of each individual 'transaction' is diÝ cult to trace, whereas the combined eÚ ect of a number of acquisitions of a company is detectable. Also, the registration of technological performance, e.g. through patents, usually takes place at the level of the company at large and not at the level of an acquired or merged unit. As mentioned above, some previous research reveals that M&As are expected to aÚ ect technological performance of companies, in particular in R&D intensive industries. We chose companies in the international computer sector as the primary group for the analysis because of its high-tech character 38 and the uncertainty that characterizes technological and economic development in this industry. In this study the computer industry consists of companies that produce mainframes and other computers, peripherals, CAD/CAM/CAE equipment, data communications equipment and other data processing products. The uncertainty surrounding the computer industry is well documented in a large number of popular publications and in the academic literature. 39 These uncertain conditions are caused by endogenous technological change within the industry itself, the dependence on technological developments in the supplying micro-electronics and other components industries and the convergence of computer and telecom technologies which has led to lateral entry in both industries. 40 The above implies that we analyze the eÚ ect of M&As on the technological performance of these computer companies whereas the M&As in which these companies are involved might of course be related to a variety of manufacturing industries. We excluded service related M&As from the analysis, including software related M&As. These service activities do generate technological development, however, they are also known to create few technical inventions in terms of codi ed knowledge that can only be partly measured by means of patents or similar indicators.
The above implies that, as in so many other somewhat comparable studies, we use a single-industry design, albeit with a choice for a large and international sector with a substantial number of M&As, to control for potential industry eÚ ects. We study the eÚ ect
the USA, three companies are from Asian countries and two companies are European. These 35 companies (see Appendix 1) with M&As, are taken from a total of 100 companies that account for more than 90% of the international computer market. 41 In terms of market share, the 35 M&A-active companies in our sample represent nearly 70% of the international computer market. The other 65 companies, all relatively small rms, did not have any M&A during the period under investigation. Given the major diÚ erences between these sub-populations, in terms of the size of companies and their relevance to the computer industry, it is impossible to use the other sub-population as a control group.
Variables
We took the patent intensity growth of US patents of the companies in the sample from 1989 to 1994 as an indicator of the dependent variable technological performance. We use the number of patents that rms applied for in all IPC classes to measure their technological performance. As with so many other indicators, this patent indicator is subject to a debate regarding its bias and shortcomings. 42 However, despite some shortcomings it is generally accepted as the most appropriate indicator that enables us to compare the technological performance of companies. 43 Even authors that are critical of the overall use of patents as an indicator of technological performance or innovation, admit that they are appropriate in the context of the current, high-tech sector. 44 Also, the less patents are used for cross-sectional analysis that ignores inter-sectoral diÚ erences in the propensity to patent, the better this indicator re ects the technological performance of companies.
As the size of companies will aÚ ect the technological performance of companies, as suggested by many studies, we will take the growth in 'patent intensity' (the ratio of the number of patents and total revenues) as the actual dependent variable.
The time-lag between M&As and the change in technological performance covers an average period of six years (from the mean of the years for the independent variables, 1989, to the nal year for which the changes in technological performance is measured, 1994). According to Singh, and Buono and Bowditch 45 it takes on average nearly ve years before organizations are assimilated and gains of the M&A are materialized. These studies, however, also indicate considerable variation in the assimilation process as some companies are able to unify their organizations within one year whereas it takes others substantially longer than the average of ve years. According to Scherer, and Pakes and Griliches 46 it takes on average about one year before inventions through R&D lead to patent applications. Taken together these two periods add up to an average time lag of about six years.
Given the degree of variance found for both the period of organizational assimilation and the eÚ ective time-span from R&D to patent application, as reported in previous research, we experimented with several alternative analyses. We used shorter intervals as well as diÚ erent time lags, without compromising the size of the sample. The outcomes of these alternative analyses were similar to the results presented in this paper.
In the statistical analysis presented below we will apply the following independent variables:
Related and unrelated (conglomerate) M&As are measured in terms of the (dis)similarity of the SIC code of the industries of M&A partners at the three digit level. 47 For related M&As in the computer industry we constructed a list of related SICs (see Appendix II) based on a number of in-depth studies of the computer industry and related industries. 48 This list of related SICs was presented to a small group of senior specialists from the computer industry who all con rmed that these industries are generally accepted as related industries. For each M&A the SIC code of the target company was obtained through Securities Data's database on M&As (see section on Data sources). The actual measure being used for each computer company in the sample is the share of its related M&As as a percentage of all its M&As.
Technologically related and technologically unrelated M&As are measured in terms of the (dis)similarity of the patent classi cation (IPC) code of the patents owned by the M&A partners at the three digit level. These patent classes represent the generally accepted perception of elds of technology by scientists and engineers to a similar degree as for instance industrial classes represent generally accepted classi cations of industries by economists and management scholars. 49 For technologically related M&As we constructed a list of related IPCs (see Appendix 3). The same group of specialists from the computer industry that we consulted on industry relatedness con rmed that the patent classes taken to measure technological relatedness could be used to indicate the technological relatedness of M&As. If the majority of the M&A target's patents falls in related IPC classes, then the target company is considered to be technologically related. The actual measure for each company is the share of technologically related M&As as a percentage of all its M&As.
R&D intensity of M&A partners is measured as the ratio of the R&D intensity of the M&A partners, based on their average R&D expenditures of the two years before the M&A, controlling for the average sector R&D intensity. We calculated this variable as follows. We rst assessed the R&D intensity of each single rm against its industry average. If, e.g. a target company has a 1.5 higher R&D intensity than the industry average, the value of that ratio would be 1.5. Then, in order to arrive at one overall ratio for the combined set of M&As we added up the ratios and divided this number by the number of M&As. This overall ratio of the combined M&As is divided by the ratio of the acquirer. This nal measure is the value of the variable in the analysis. For example, if the acquirer has a ratio of 0.5 (half the intensity of the industry average) and the combined set of targets have a ratio of 1.5 then the value of this variable is 3. The ratio of the acquired rm is three times higher than that of the acquiring rm, i.e. the ratio is 3 (1.5 divided by 0.5). Thus, the higher the value of this measure, the higher the R&D intensity of the target(s) in comparison to the R&D intensity of the acquirer.
Similarity of size of M&A partners refers to the ratio of the size of both companies involved in the M&A. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total revenues in the year before the M&A. Logarithms are taken to correct for a small number of very large companies. We divided the size of the acquiring rm by the size of the target rm. Because in all the cases the acquiring rm was the larger of the two, a lower ratio implies more similarity among the rms. The ratios of size for companies with a number of M&As are also added up and divided by the number of their M&As.
Control Variables
The R&D intensity of the companies in the sample (1986-1992), i.e. R&D expenditures as a share of total revenues, is taken as a control variable because we expect a direct eÚ ect of R&D on patent activity as research eÚ orts will (at least partly) be transformed into patents. In the literature the relation between R&D and patents has been studied extensively. Kamien and Schwartz 50 have established that on average there is a direct relation between inventive eÚ ort or input and technological output. However, it is added that other factors can in uence the transformation and the relation may not be linear. In some studies 51 it is mentioned that patenting output decreases gradually with an increase of R&D expenditures.
Research on the eÚ ect of the internationalization of innovative activities through international M&As suggests both positive and negative eÚ ects of this international diversi cation on technological performance, but the positive eÚ ects seem to be dominant. 52 These positive eÚ ects are largely due to diÚ erent local advantages generated by international R&D sourcing through acquired companies. Therefore, we will control for the international and domestic character of the M&As of the companies in the sample. The international and domestic character of the M&As of a company is determined by the share of international M&As in the total number of its M&As as registered according to the home country of the headquarters of companies during the period 1986-1992.
A third control variable that we introduce relates to the possible eÚ ect of experience with establishing of M&As on the performance of M&As. It is well known that one of the main problems for companies active in the eld of M&As is the diÝ cult task of acquiring adequate information on target rms. It is obvious that, depending on the situation, target companies might have an incentive to somewhat misrepresent their innovative potential by overstating or understating their technological capabilities and the value of their research programs. This 'inspection problem' with M&As or the problem of the possible lack of adequate information can be solved partially by experience as companies establish some routines and learning capabilities regarding the valuation of other companies. As suggested in the literature 53 companies that have built up some experience in M&As might nd it easier to assess the value of target rms. Experience with the actual incorporation of the R&D programs of other companies in the overall technology strategy will also help to improve the post-M&A performance. This suggests that experienced M&A active rms have higher post-merger technological performance than inexperienced companies. Experience with M&As is measured by taking the natural logarithm of the number of M&As made during the seven years period from 1986 to 1992. We would have preferred a longer period or a period prior to the one for the other dependent variables but unfortunately there are no earlier international data available.
Data Sources
Data on M&As for the period 1986-1992 is derived from a data bank owned by Securities Data, which we used via on-line access. This data bank contains information on worldwide M&As. Within this database there is information on the year the M&A was established and company information on the acquirer, the target, the parent acquirer and the parent target rm. The industry information is provided in SIC codes of the acquiree and acquirer.
Data for the size of companies and their R&D expenditures is taken from several issues of Gartner Group's annual Yardstick top 100 worldwide covering a period from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. The Yardstick top 100 worldwide is an authoritative statistical review of the international computer industry comprising the top 100 computer companies. Data in the Yardstick was updated annually through surveys and research by Gartner Group consultants and industry analysts. When data was missing, estimates were taken from industry analyst input and from other available industry sources. The Yardstick contains calendar year information, not information based upon scal years, which allows us to make better comparisons between companies. Also, the Gartner data is adjusted for the eÚ ect of currency exchange rates.
We obtained additional data on R&D, size and revenues of companies involved in M&As through well-known databases such as Compustat, Disclosure and Worldscope. We used Dun and Bradstreet's Global Linkages to track the subsidiaries of each company in our sample in order to include patents that were led by some of these subsidiaries.
The data on patents for the dependent variable (technological performance) is taken from the US Patent and Trademark OÝ ce database (US Department of Commerce). Although this US data could imply a bias in favour of US companies and against non-US rms, the group of non-US companies in this sample represents a group of innovative and rather large rms that are known to patent worldwide. Furthermore, the literature suggests several other reasons to take US patents as an indicator. Frequently mentioned are the importance of the US market, the 'real' patent protection oÚ ered by US authorities, the level of technological sophistication of the US market which makes it almost compulsory for non-US companies to le patents in the USA. 54 
Analysis
In order to test the hypotheses we applied a standard ordinary least square regression model (see Table 2 ). The correlations in Table 1 do not suggest multi-collinearity. However, given the relatively high R 2 of the model we undertook some additional tests to detect possible multi-collinearity. We regressed each independent variable on all the other independent variables 55 -this test did not indicate multi-collinearity. In addition, we used a number of other multi-collinearity diagnostics, taking a closer look at VIF and Tolerance value statistics, which also did not detect any signs of multi-collinearity. Table 2 demonstrates that hypothesis 1 is supported as our analysis generates a signi cant, positive relationship between the degree to which companies use related M&As and their technological performance. Hypothesis 2, which concerns technological relatedness, is also supported as we found a statistically signi cant and positive eÚ ect of these technologically related M&As on the technological performance of companies. Our other results show that the acquisition and merging of companies with higher R&D intensity signi cantly improves the technological performance of the acquiring rm (hypothesis 3 is con rmed). Also, the expected relationship between the degree of similarity in terms of the size of companies involved in M&As and the technological performance of the acquiring rms (hypothesis 4) was indeed established in our analysis (lower scores are associated with greater similarity).
The control variable for the R&D intensity of companies seems to have a signi cant, albeit negative, impact on the improved technological performance of companies. This indicates that, as already found in other contributions discussed in the above, patenting output decreases with an increase of R&D expenditures. In other words, an increase in R&D intensity of companies does not imply a parallel growth in technological performance. Our ndings for the second control variable suggest that, as found in some previous research, international M&As improve the technological performance of companies. However, extensive experience of companies with M&As does not seem to in uence their technological performance.
Discussion
Our analysis demonstrates that major aspects of the strategic and organizational t of companies engaged in M&As seem important for generating improved technological performance in an international high-tech environment. Our ndings suggest that the strategic t between companies in related product markets increases the innovative potential of M&As. This nding adds additional support to much of the empirical evidence of previous research on the economic performance of M&As that indicates that related diversi cation through M&As is more bene cial to companies than unrelated diversi cation. 56 The role of this particular aspect of the strategic t of companies in explaining performance improvement supports much of the conventional wisdom from, for example, economics regarding the economies of scale and scope that companies can achieve when they expand into related activities. The strategic t of M&As in terms of broad product-market categories seems to generate a baseline for joint activities that secures the overall relevance of the M&As to the improved performance of the combined companies. However, it is important to note that this aspect of the strategic t is still largely related to the existing activities of companies, whereas the technological capabilities of merging companies are expected to be also dependent on future-oriented technological aspects of their strategic t.
It appears that linking up to more R&D intensive companies generates strong results in terms of higher technological performance. We recall that some of the older literatures 57 already indicated that M&As with R&D intensive rms would enable acquiring companies to increase control over high-tech environments that are relevant to them. When companies establish M&As with other companies of higher R&D intensity, this implies that they are integrating partners that are more likely to be engaged in new activities, which adds to the formation of new capabilities and learning skills within the new entity. In other words, these R&D intensive M&As are instrumental to the more general process of exploratory learning 58 and they play an important role in the improvement of technological competencies that are crucial for companies to remain competitive in a high-tech environment. 59 It is obvious that the 'depth' of the technological relatedness of M&As, i.e. the complementarity in higher R&D eÚ orts, aÚ ects the increased R&D potential of the combined companies. When companies engage in M&As with companies with higher R&D inputs, the M&As are expected to be future oriented as the increased R&D intensity of these companies focuses on the search for new technologies, products and processes. These R&D increasing M&As have a long term, strategic eÚ ect that we found to lead to improved technological performance of the combined companies.
The eÚ ect of technologically related M&As is only marginally signi cant and the statistical support is weaker than for the other variables. In that context it is important to note that there is considerable chance of duplication of existing technological capabilities, with a similar 'breadth' of technological relatedness of companies, when they only share broad patenting pro les based on previous technological achievements. In that case, there could be fewer learning opportunities and companies could have more diÝ culty engaging in new activities and developing new technological capabilities that will lead to improved technological performance. In other words, unlike the 'depth' of technological relatedness, the 'breadth' of technological relatedness of M&As merely re ects the status quo of the technological capabilities of companies and this expansion through technologically similar M&As can be expected to only have a marginal eÚ ect on the improved technological performance of rms. Combining companies with similar technological capabilities and a somewhat similar technological track record merely duplicates existing capabilities that only have a limited impact on the future technological performance of the combined companies. 60 The organizational t of companies, their similarity in size, which we found to be important to explain improved technological performance, seems to bene t the actual integration process of merging companies. Previous research 61 already mentioned that large diÚ erences in size of companies indicate dissimilarities in the organizational setting of partners, which might frustrate the actual post-merger integration process. From the perspective of the technological performance of M&As, our research shows that a large diÚ erence in size of companies, indicating a poor organizational t, generates weaker performance than in the case of greater organizational similarity of partners. The popular business literature provides many examples from high-tech industries (in particular biotechnology, software, microelectronics and computers) where large companies have great diÝ culty in integrating small companies with a diÚ erent 'culture' while keeping key-employees from these acquisitions 'on board'.
Although not directly related to the eÚ ect of strategic and organizational t on the technological performance of companies, our research suggests some interesting results for international M&As and the eÚ ect of experience with M&As on technological performance. It appears that companies that have a preference for international M&As, that bene t from several international R&D sources and from diÚ erent regionally concentrated technological competencies, improve their technological performance. As discussed in the above this highlights the importance of international learning through M&As as being very important for companies in a high-tech environment that has also become highly internationalized. 62 Somewhat surprisingly, we found no clear evidence of the positive eÚ ect of the experience of companies through a larger number of M&As. Increasing the number of M&As does not seem to necessarily improve the performance of companies in a linear way. However, most companies in this sample have some experience with M&As as they made more than one M&A in a few years. What this nding does indicate is that, if there is an experience eÚ ect regarding M&As at all, the eÚ ect of increased experience would most probably wear oÚ beyond a rather low threshold. Also, as suggested by Hitt et al., 63 for companies to learn from their M&As, the sheer number of M&As could be less decisive than their eÚ ective learning capability with regard to M&As and other external sources of innovation.
Conclusions
Our study focuses on a single, high-tech industry, albeit a large one and with an international population consisting of a variety of companies, that are studied for a period of nearly a decade. As our results might re ect some industry and period-speci c factors, elaboration of the study in diÚ erent settings could generate useful additional insights. With this caveat in mind, we can draw the following conclusions.
Our research demonstrates that M&As can contribute to improving the technological performance of companies in a high-tech environment. However, it has to be stressed that both the organizational and the strategic t of the companies involved in these M&As are crucial for the technological success of M&As. These critical factors were already discussed in some earlier contributions that concentrated mainly on the general eÚ ect of M&As on economic performance and pro tability. Not only does our current research establish the important role that organizational and strategic t seem to also have for the technological performance of M&A-active companies, it in particular emphasizes the importance of linking-up with more research-intensive companies. This suggests that the acquisition of these companies, through which the acquiring company can improve its technological skills and expected learning capabilities, has a positive eÚ ect on the technological performance of acquiring companies after M&As have taken place.
The current contribution does not investigate the short-term economic bene ts of M&As but it concentrates on the technological performance of companies that might have long-term strategic consequences, eventually leading to increased economic performance. In that context the M&As can be interpreted as an attempt of companies to increase both control over their environment in order to respond to uncertainty and to improve their performance. The successful integration of other companies in a familiar environment and the search for new opportunities through M&As are both mentioned in that context as major mechanisms in a two-fold strategy to improve technological performance. The relevance of market relatedness of M&As stresses the importance of uncertainty reduction by means of integration of companies that are active in similar sectors and that have some similarity in terms of product-markets. The integration of R&D intensive companies, however, creates the necessary new skills and capabilities that enable the company to learn about new perspectives that can decrease its dependency on its existing environment and improve its performance. Therefore, the external acquisition of technological capabilities by means of M&As can, if proper attention is paid to the strategic and organizational t of companies, prove to be an important strategic advantage for companies in high-tech sectors.
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